Introduction
The introduction of the U.S. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 eliminated any functional barriers between commercial and investment bank activities, allowing the U.S. banks to offer a full range of financial services. At the same time, the adoption of the securitization model in which banks allocate their funding not only to lending activities, but also to asset securitization, provided the field for additional funding mechanisms, known as non-traditional items. As a result, the new banking model gave rise to a reduced need of traditional bank services, to the presence of higher systematic risks, and to the need of more effective regulation (Cetorelli and Persitiani, 2012; Claessens and Ratnovski, 2013) . Gambacorta and van Rixtel (2013) argue that the recent financial crisis triggered a reassessment of the argument that non-traditional bank activities can offer value added to banks' profitability.
The non-traditional bank activities, such as items associated with securitization, investment banking, advisory fees, venture capital, and non-hedging derivatives, are totally differentiated from traditional bank activities, i.e. deposit taking and lending functioning (Pozsar et al., 2010) , while they can be a substantial source of systemic risk, both directly and through their interconnectedness with the traditional bank activities. Higher levels of diversifications make the bank system too complex and, thus, substantial agency problems may arise.
The goal of this work is to shed light on the empirical identification about how non-traditional activities conducted by U.S. banks influence their profitabilityrisk trade-off. The novelties of the paper come to fill certain voids in the relevant literature, such as: i) by considering a very recent period -including the financial crisis 2007 event-that no other study has done it before, ii) a number of robustness empirical tests that sharpen the interpretation of our findings and lend clear support to our baseline results, and iii) by providing the extent to which disaggregated nontraditional bank activities contribute to profitability and risk profiles.
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The empirical findings provide evidence that such non-traditional bank activities exert a positive effect on both the profitability and the risk profiles of banking institutions involved in such activities. In terms of the disaggregation framework, the findings show that there is not any unified behavior across all the components of such non-traditional bank activities. For a number of components, related to mortgage-backed securities, there is a statistically significant valuecreating and risk-increasing empirical finding, albeit it is smaller vis-à-vis the aggregate outcome, implying that these components require banks to take relatively long-term stakes in assets. These findings highlight the need of regulatory bodies to better monitor the market that ignited the financial crisis event.
This paper is related to the corporate finance literature and to the role of diversification costs emerging from non-traditional activities along with the effects on the regular bank system's valuations and risk profiles. This literature has exemplified the limited diversification gains in terms of higher profitability and reduced risk for those institutions that attempt to diversify their portfolios of activities, i.e. traditional and non-traditional activities, while a number of studies in the literature supports the view that banks must focus on those lines of business that their management has a comparative advantage over alternative activities. The main strand in this literature focuses on the regulatory arbitrage obtained by the business of non-traditional banking (Acharya et al., 2013) . According to this view, banks conduct non-traditional bank activities so as to circumvent regulatory capital requirements which might increase the fragility and the collapse of the system. This paper is related to this strand in the sense that it also examines the impact of such non-traditional bank activities on the fragility of the banking system. Section 2 provides a review of the literature of non-traditional bank activities, while Section 3 discusses the data and presents the empirical analysis.
Finally, concluding remarks and policy implications are provided in section 4.
Literature review
One main strand of the literature highlights the need of the financial institutions to be involved in non-traditional bank activities due to the presence of gains. Myers and Rajan (1998) offer the differences in asset mix as an explanation for the tendency of banking institutions to be involved in activities away from the M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 4 traditional bank zone, differences that motivate bank managers to trade against banks' interests. Cornett et al. (2002) and Deng et al. (2007) present evidence that non-traditional bank activities are expected to reduce the cost of debt, while Mester (2010) supports that banks experience high economies of scale and benefits by expanding their portfolio of activities into non-traditional items, while any attempt to restrain them from doing so would have unintended consequences.
By contrast, in the strand of the literature that documents the negative side of non-traditional bank activities, a large number of studies have stressed the negative side of non-traditional bank activities. More specifically, Stiroh (2004a,b) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) investigate whether small U.S. banks experience diversification gains from being involved in non-traditional activities. The results reveal the negative impact of non-traditional bank related activities on banks' performance, while for the case of U.S. financial holding companies they provide strong evidence that non-traditional bank activities contribute substantial to the deterioration of banks' risk profiles. Laeven and Levine (2007) highlight that the diversification of activities does not bring the benefits (i.e., higher returns, efficient allocations of resources, and economies of scope that boost valuations) expected, but it intensifies agency problems across certain groups of those institutions' stakeholders with further negative implications on both their profitability and their value. Schmid and Walter (2009) document that the banking sector, by expanding its functional operation into non-traditional activities, leads to predominantly value discounts, with the only exceptions being those where combinations between commercial bank and insurance activities as well as between commercial and investment bank activities do exist.
In terms of the impact of non-traditional bank activities on banks' risk profiles, DeJonghe (2010) displays that banking institutions that are heavily involved in non-traditional activities are characterized by higher risks, which makes them more vulnerable to a number of market and macroeconomic shocks. He also argues that this new source of systematic risk exacerbates not only overall financial instability, but also high fluctuations in the real economy. Demircqus-Kunt and Huizinga (2011) provide evidence that banks that highly diversify their activities portfolios are riskier because not only they heavily depend on non-interest income as the principal source of their revenues, but also because they chose to do so. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) provide evidence that the components of noninterest income equally contribute to systematic risk, while the values of involved institutions are reduced across both components. DeYoung and Torna (2012) argue that certain components of non-traditional items, such as fee-for-service income, do not lead to reduced values only for the case of healthy banks, while the opposite is true for financially distressed institutions. Gambacorta and van Rixtel (2013) also argue that non-traditional bank activities have not resulted in higher profitability, lower earnings volatility, and lower levels of systematic risks, while any benefits originated from such items seem to be related to specific geographical and loan portfolio diversification characteristics. Their results receive empirical support by (2012) provides an overview of the non-traditional bank system in the Euro area. The size of this system is relatively smaller in comparison to that of the U.S., representing less than half of the total assets of the banking sector. The non-traditional bank system in Europe is diverse across countries, reflecting differences in legal and regulatory structures, while securitization issuance is smaller in volume and remains less developed than in the U.S. They also highlight the increase in Euro banks' M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 6 reliance on funding from the financial sector, with the bulk of the financing originating from other financial institutions (OFIs) that includes non-traditional bank entities.
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Methodological issues
Following a version of the Rivard and Thomas (1997) 
where i = 1, …, N for each bank in the panel and t = 1, …, T refers to the time period. The parameter α i allows for the possibility of bank-specific fixed effects.
ROA (return of assets) defines bank's profitability, while IR is the insolvency risk index. Although the primary interest is the investigation of non-traditional bank activities on firms' profitability and risk profiles, we also control for a number of bank-specific as well as economy-specific characteristics that could affect both profitability and risk profiles. In particular, NTR defines total non-traditional activities (defined in the Data Section), LA is the ratio of loans to assets, serving as a proxy for liquidity, CAR is the equity to assets ratio, NONPL is the ratio of nonperforming loans that measures the quality of the main assets of banks, HHI is the 
equilibrium. The interaction term between the non-traditional bank activities and the crisis dummy reflects the impact of these activities during the crisis period.
In terms now of the model described by equations (1) and (2), profitability is expressed as a function of internal determinants, i.e. factors that are mainly influenced by a bank's management decisions and policy objectives, such as the level of liquidity, capital adequacy, and expenses management, and external determinants, i.e. industry-related determinants, such as the competitive degree of the bank sector, as well as macroeconomic-related determinants, such as economic growth and inflation (Athanasoglou et al., 2005) . Liquidity risk is an important determinant of bank profitability. We would expect a positive relationship between liquidity and profitability (Eichengreen and Gibson, 2001 ). In addition, lower capital ratios suggest a relatively risky position, and thus we would expect a negative coefficient on this variable (Berger, 1995) . However, higher levels of equity could decrease the cost of capital, leading to a positive impact on profitability (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) , while an increase in capital may raise expected earnings by reducing the expected costs of financial distress, including bankruptcy (Berger, 1995) . The literature argues that operating expenses affect positively the profitability of a financial institution (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992),
while Mamatzakis et al. (2005) provide evidence that a non-collusive behavior among banks suggests the presence of a contestable market.
Finally, bank profitability is sensitive to macroeconomic conditions despite a larger use of financial engineering techniques to manage risks associated with business cycles. Higher economic growth encourages banks to lend more and permits them to charge higher margins as well as improving the quality of their assets. Neely and Wheelock (1997) use per capita income and suggest that this variable exerts a strong positive effect on bank earnings. Another proxy for the effect of the macroeconomic environment on bank profitability is inflation. The question is how mature an economy is so that future inflation can be accurately forecasted and, thus, banks can accordingly manage their operating costs. As such, the relationship between the inflation rate and profitability is ambiguous and depends on whether or not inflation is anticipated, though most studies observe a positive relationship between inflation and bank performance (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) .
Finally, we make use of the panel cointegration methodology to control for potential endogeneity biases as well as for omitted variable concerns. In addition to bank fixed effects, we also control for the clustering effect across banks, given the interconnectedness of banks in the non-traditional bank markets. To this end, we make use of the Thompson (2011) methodology which computes standard errors that are robust to the presence of the clustering effect.
Data
Our dataset covers a number of full services U.S. financial institutions that are involved in non-traditional bank activities. Therefore, the dataset involves a wide range of such activities, such as structured asset-backed securities (ABS), Our panel is composed of annual data for 1,725 banks. We consider investment and commercial banks. Investment banks and commercial banks conduct much of their business within the non-traditional bank system. It should be noted that the sample used is less than the total number of observations in the database because the information has been filtered using two criteria: (i) outliers;
and (ii) those observations without data for any of the variables necessary for estimating profitability and risk profiles have been dropped. We use unconsolidated statements since they are preferred to avoid relevant differences in profit and loss statements and balance sheets of headquarters and subsidiaries compensating each other.
Following Rivard and Thomas (1997) , profitability is measured as the bank's average accounting return on assets (ROA), defined as the before-tax profits divided by total assets. The type of risk analyzed in this paper is insolvency risk, which is
present because a bank may be unable to meet obligations to creditors. The insolvency risk index (IR) is a ratio in which the numerator is a measure of volatility of earnings and the denominator is the sum of the expected earnings plus a measure of the owner's equity. Specifically, it is calculated as the standard deviation of ROA divided by the sum of average ROA and the average equity assets ratio. It is a better measure of bank risk than the volatility risk (the standard deviation of ROA), because it accounts for the fact that banks with the same volatility risk may have higher expected ROA and equity-to-asset ratios, and hence are less likely to be at high risk.
To control for all the other variables that could affect profitability, we make use of: the ratio of loans to assets (LA), serving as a proxy for liquidity. Capital-toasset ratio is another important variable affecting bank risk, proxied by the equity to assets ratio (CAR), while the ratio of non-performing loans measures the quality of the main assets of banks (NONPL). It is always true that the NOPL ratio is negatively related to profitability and positively related to bank risk. 
Results
We begin with examining the order of integration for each variable using Next, the fully modified OLS (FMOLS) estimation approach for heterogeneous cointegrated panels is estimated to determine the long-run equilibrium relationship. As shown in Table 1 and in terms of equation (1), the results show that the coefficient of non-traditional bank activities exerts a positive and statistically significant at the 1% level effect on profitability. In particular, a dollar increase in non-traditional bank activities increases profitability by 11.6 cents, while in terms of equation (2) revenues, but they simultaneously further increase banks' risks.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The significance of the interaction term between non-traditional bank activities and the crisis dummy signifies that non-traditional banking has been largely exposed to the recent financial crisis. In particular, both the negative coefficient of the interaction term in equation (1) and the positive coefficient of the interaction term in equation (2) document that non-traditional banking is vulnerable and fragile to run-like events. A number of core funding markets froze up as financial institutions lost the confidence to lend to one another. For instance, borrowing limits were reduced, the terms of transactions shortened, haircuts on private securities were accepted as collateral widened, and the range of securities accepted as collateral narrowed down to all but the safest, while markets for various asset-backed securities collapsed, i.e. especially, markets for mortgage-backed securities and various other structured products essentially closed. Finally and in terms of the control variables, the signs turn out to be as theoretically expected.
Robustness
We embark upon a number of robustness tests to investigate the validity of our results related to alternative definitions of the banks' performance in terms of M A N U S C R I P T
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12 profitability and risk profiles, to the role of the size, to the individual contribution of each item involved in the non-traditional activities to such performance, to the separation between investment and commercial banks, and, to the quantitative investigation over the period before and after the recent financial crisis event.
It is well recognized that large banks tend to be more active in engaging in non-traditional banking due to the complexity of products involved and the associated costs in acquiring such knowledge (Claessens et al., 2012) . In addition, size is expected to affect profitability and risk profiles through economies of scale (Lang and Stulz, 1994) , while large banks involved in both traditional and nontraditional activities are characterized by organizational deficiencies related to different technologies employed (Williamson, 1988; Stein, 2002; Mercieca et al., 2007) , while small banks are less active participants in non-traditional banking.
Therefore, we test whether the obtained results above can vary with bank size by making explicitly the distinction between large and small banks. The criterion for separating the aggregate sample of banks into two subsamples is the median of their assets. All banks above the median are classified as large banks (i.e., 357 banks), while those below the median are classified as small banks (i.e., 1,368 banks). The new panel FMOLS estimates are reported in Table 2 . They show that the impact of non-traditional bank activities (NTR) on both the profitability and risk profiles turns out to be stronger for the case of large banks vis-à-vis the case of small banks (i.e., in terms of profitability, the figures are 0.196 vs 0.057 for large and small banks, respectively, while in terms of risk, the figures are 0.188 vs 0.061 for large and small banks, respectively). Finally, at the bottom of the table we report a test to investigate the difference in estimated coefficients on profitability and risk across large and small banks, with p-values shown in brackets. The test confirms that the difference in the estimated coefficients is significant in both the profitability and risk cases.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
To ensure the robustness of our results, we also consider alternative measures of profitability and risk profiles. In particular, profitability is defined as Return on portfolios are associated with a higher probability of insolvency and lower riskadjusted returns.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In this strand of robustness testing we consider the explicit categories included in the definition of non-traditional items and defined in the Data Section. In particular,
we make use of the nine-way taxonomy of non-traditional items that will allow us to estimate the impact of certain separate non-traditional channels could have on profitability and risk. Therefore, we consider the individual ( Table 4 . They show that there is not a unified behavior across the components of such (disaggregated) non-traditional bank activities. In eight out of ten components (i.e., ABS, CDOL, CDOABS, CDO2, CDO3, TOB, SMC, and MSC) there is a statistically significant value-creating and risk-increasing empirical finding, albeit it is smaller vis-à-vis the aggregate outcomes reported in Table 1 . A potential explanation for this line of differentiation may be lying on the fact that the eight non-traditional components require banks to take relatively long-term stakes in assets, while the opposite is true for the remaining two components.
Alternatively, considering that our analysis includes the recent financial crisis event, while the former group involves mortgage-backed securities which comprise the market that ignited this event, the empirical results highlight the importance of mortgage-related items for the documented positive impact on risk, emerging from rapid declines in the prices of mortgage-related securities (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2008) .
[Insert Table 4 about here]
This part of robustness testing performs an additional test of the baseline results displayed in Table 1 . In particular, it considers the separation between investment Table 5 . The results document that the impact of non-traditional bank activities retains the positive signs for both the profitability (ROA) and the insolvency risk (IR) variables. However, the impact of such activities turns out to be stronger for the case of investment banks, indicating that such activities are associated with higher systematic risks for investment vs commercial banks. We also report a test for the difference in estimated coefficients on profitability and risk, with p-values shown in brackets. The test confirms that the difference in the estimated coefficients for investment and commercial banks is statistically significant.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Finally, in this strand of robustness testing we split our sample into two periods. We Table 6 . The results indicate that over the post-crisis period, the impact of nontraditional bank activities on profitability tends to be weaker (0.214 vs 0.126), while it turns out to be stronger on the insolvency risk (0.085 vs 0.138). Finally, the table reports a test for the difference in estimated coefficients over the pre-and post-crisis periods, with p-values shown in brackets. The test confirms that the difference in the estimated coefficients for the pre-and post-crisis period is significant in both the profitability and risk cases.
The new findings document that the impact of financial crisis event seems to have further exposed the weaknesses adhered to the guarding against the re-M A N U S C R I P T
16 emergence of systematic risks. Over the post-crisis period, banks experienced an increase in their riskiness and a decrease in their profitability as the risks they had undertaken before the eruption of the crisis materialized. At the same time, after the eruption of the crisis they continued to be involved in risky non-traditional activities and were not optimizing their business lines. They were simply trying to stay afloat, with their balance sheets and income statements being largely determined by the binding external constraints they were facing. This stressed situation largely contributed to a stronger impact on their insolvency risks and potentially increased the chances that these banks could fail. The financial crisis highlighted that such non-traditional bank activities embraced higher systematic risks, leading to a worse trade-off between profitability (returns) and insolvency risks. The new evidence also indicates that banks failed to properly internalize the associated risks in their individual decision-making processes, supporting the introduction of stronger macro-prudential policies and more efficient regulatory frameworks.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Concluding remarks
This research paper studied the quantitative influence of non-traditional bank activities on profitability and insolvency risk for a number of U.S. financial institutions involved in such activities over the period January 2000-April 2013.
The methodology of panel cointegration found that the introduction of nontraditional banking directly affects (positively) profitability and (positively) insolvency risk, suggesting that this type of activities is relevant for the fragility and the future of the entire banking system. Our results were robust to a number of robustness tests related to alternative definitions for profitability and risk profiles, the role of the size, the contribution of individual non-traditional items, the separation between commercial and investment banks, and the separation of the time span into the period before and after the recent crisis event.
The empirical findings seem to partially disagree with traditional arguments The earlier empirical literature on risk-adjusted returns provided overwhelming pertinent evidence, without employing the high-powered econometric techniques of this paper. Moreover, arguments in favor of such movements included improved earnings stability, improved X-efficiencies, and improved scale and scope economies. Coyne et al. (2004) , however, argued that such expectations had been overestimated.
In relevance to the implications derived from our empirical findings, the results could serve as a pre-warning function that sends a clear message to regulators about the potential systemic risk that exists within the financial markets.
Regulators should expand and intensify their supervisory resources over banks involved in non-traditional activities. Basel III requirements are not the sole answer.
The recent crash was originated outside the traditional bank activities zone, while
Basel III does not intervene in the banks' business model, but only imposes certain capital and liquidity constraints that depend entirely on the riskiness of banks'
business. Hence, how to regulate the whole financial system, in a way that the systematic risk can be minimized, becomes the next challenge for regulators. 
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